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DECISION ANALYSIS FOR CONSTRUCTION
CONTRACT RISK-SHARING
Teh-Chang Lee*, Ta-Hsing Lee*, and Ching-Hwang Wang*
Key words: construction contract, risk-sharing, analytic hierarchy
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ABSTRACT
As the risk-sharing provisions in domestic public construction contracts are not completely fair and reasonable, contract
disputes often arise as a result which in turn cause delays,
quality impacts, and other problems that urgently need improvement. Introduced in this article is the development of a
decision system for risk-sharing in public construction contracts. Said system was developed through literature review,
questionnaire and interviews of experts, fuzzy synthetic
evaluation in conjunction of analytic hierarchy process, definition of risks in public construction contracts, and establishment of decision models for risk-sharing. Subsequently,
the “escalation” risk was employed as an example to select
suitable decision models for analyzing risk-sharing decisions.
The evaluation model of contract risk-sharing performance
established in this article can be the basis for authority in its
optimal risk-sharing decision-making.
According to result of decision analysis made in this article
for risk of “rising price and wages,” it is suggested that the
authority shall select the sharing program of “adjust the portion with rising/falling amplitude exceeding (5%) according to
particular price index” for construction with duration exceeding 1 year. The authority is also suggested to set fair and
reasonable contract that regulates rights and obligations for
both parties with principle of equal and mutual benefit.

I. PREFACE
The fair and reasonable risk-sharing is helpful for smooth
completion of construction, cost saving and prevention of
contractual dispute. However, research and investigation [16,
18] have shown that in order to protect its own interests, construction authority in the past often made use of exceptions to
exert most of the risks onto the contractors. Although the
Paper submitted 09/07/07; accepted 12/25/07. Author for Corresponding:
Ta-Hsing Lee (e-mail: daniel.lee@maaconsultants.com).
*Department of Construction Engineering, National Taiwan University of
Science and Technology, Taipei, Taiwan, R.O.C.

authority can avoid the risk with such contract agreement that
is lack of fairness, adverse effect can possibly arise due to the
over provision and cause difficulty to undertaking personnel;
moreover, it is found from many cases of arbitration [3] and
mediation [10] that the authority may still need to compensate
the contractor’s loss due to breach for violating principle of
fair and sincere contract. In addition, the increase of contract
risk is not only incapable of stopping unworthy companies on
vicious acquisition of tender, but also strangles willingness of
tendering from honest companies, which forms the vicious
circle of “bad elements driving good elements away” and
hence no protection is provided on construction quality.
In order to improve the above mentioned defects, Article 6,
Paragraph 2 of the “Government Procurement Act” particularly specifies that the authority shall base on the principle of
maintenance on public interest and reasonable fairness upon
setting of procurement contract. In Paragraph 3 of the same
Article, power is given to the purchaser within the scope of not
violating regulation of the Government Procurement Act,
where such purchaser can base on the consideration for public
interest, efficiency of procurement and professional judgment
to decide on suitable procurement; in this way, efficiency and
function of procurement can be improved as well as assurance
on quality of procurement. Nevertheless, contractual amount
and hidden risk involved in public construction are often vast
and complicated, the selection on suitable decision making of
risk-sharing is truly an important subject that is worth for
discussion at present under principle of reasonable fairness; so
that both contractual parties can bear affordable risks and
thoroughly bring out their professional skills to pursue maximum profit for the overall construction.
In view of this, the article starts with brief description on
connotation of risk-sharing decision for public construction
contract. This follows logic of decision on risk-sharing to
define risk of public construction contract and establish
risk-sharing decision model, develop the “Risk-sharing decision system for public construction contract”; moreover, the
recent risk of “escalation” that seriously affect execution of
domestic public construction is taken as example for escalation
of suitable decision model and execution on decision analysis
relating to risk-sharing, which provides reference for the authority upon selection on risk-sharing decision and setting of
contractual clauses.
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II. STRUCTURE OF DECISION SYSTEM FOR
PUBLIC CONSTRUCTION CONTRACT
RISK-SHARING

(3) Reducing fixed cost needed for undertaking the risk via
reasonable sharing of contract risk by both parties.
(4) Promoting peaceful work relationships between both
parties, which reduces contract dispute.

1. Overview of Public Construction Contract Risk-Sharing
The so-called ”Public Construction Contract Risk-Sharing”
discusses about suitable selection of risk-sharing decision
model against various (each) construction contract risk and
through adequate contract arrangement, risks within certain
level and scope are distributed to owner and/or contractor that
can deal with the risks in most economical and effective way.
Various feasible measure of risk-sharing are offered to optimal
adjustment of overall risk burden for both parties of the construction contract, which expects to obtain maximum benefit
of procurement contract. In quoted words:
1. The priority of risk-sharing decision lies on selecting suitable way of classification; it executes systematic classification on each contract risk of project construction. Further
analysis and definition is then made against the property of
risk (possibility of forecast and prevent in advance) and
characteristics of loss (individual and type of loss), which
provides fundamentals of risk distribution.
2. The decision of risk-sharing does no go deep into method of
handling the risk itself; instead, discussion is made on most
“effective” way of handling the risk or selection for most
“economical” way of sharing in accordance with the characteristics of the risk.
3. In addition to individual undertaking by certain part on lost
of certain risk, there is still option on method of risk-sharing
according to result of decision analysis:
(1) The loss from risk is shared by both parties at fixed
amount and/or proportion.
(2) One party undertakes the loss from work duration and
the other party undertakes loss in cost.
(3) One party is obliged to prevent or reduce occurrence or
damage from the risk and the other party undertakes the
actual loss from risk.
4. The authority can consider characteristics and budget of
project construction, as well as resources and managing
ability possessed by itself to discuss on feasible sharing
measure of “risk reduction” and “finance benefit,” which
reduces financial (or risk) burden for the supplier and enhances supplier’s ability of contract performance.
5. With adequate contract arrangement afterwards and under
pre-requisite of not violating legal requirement, selected
program of risk-sharing is carried out in practice via thorough and precise contractual requirement.
6. As for expected requisition of benefit on procurement contract from reasonable sharing of contract risk, such benefit
is mainly provided for [1, 2, 24]:
(1) Reminding the parties concerned to pay attention on
rights and obligations of both parties under the contract,
which enhances cost benefit of contract management.
(2) Reducing uncertainty of contract risk, which eliminates
risk not necessary for both parties to undertake.

2. Guideline of Risk-Sharing Decision
According to result of discussion on relevant literature, the
decision guideline relating to risk-sharing can be basically
summarized as follows:
1. According to principle of “responsibility of mistake,” the
loss from risk is undertaken by responsible party.
2. With concept of “advantageous risk bearer” [7, 20], assessment is made on both parties of the contract for determining the party that has better ability of prevention, reduction, handling or transfer against occurrence of the risk,
where the risk bearer is appointed accordingly.
3. Evaluate item that needs lower cost (compared price) of risk
handling with the concept of “bargain insurer” [7, 20], or
discuss on sharing method (or program) to be adopted, so
both parties spend least amount of total cost for risk-sharing
and the method can be taken as guideline for risk distribution.
4. Discuss on the type of risk-sharing program that can obtain
best benefit of overall contract with consideration on “performance of risk-sharing,” which can be taken as criterion
of sharing decision [4].
However, the above guidelines only act as principle descriptions, the basis of assessment or evaluation and method of
execution are still to be explored further. The following section will base on the above mentioned guidelines to establish
qualitative or quantitative model for analysis decision, which
provides reference for the authority while setting up the
risk-sharing decision.
3. Risk-Sharing Decision Model
1) Risk Liability Judgment Model
(I) Structure of Judgment
The public construction contract is taken as the agreed
contract and principles of civil contract adopted. Therefore,
discussion shall be made first to see if the risk involves with
liability for non-fulfillment of debt, tort liability and risk-bearing
liability specified by “the Civil Code,” as well as principles of
honest credibility, fair reasonableness and changing situation
for the contract while setting the risk-sharing decision. After
that, risks are distributed in accordance with judgment result
on liability of mistake with the structure of judgment shown as
Fig. 1 below.
(II) Consideration of Judgment
In order to prevent invalid contract due to legal violation
however, discussion is made on relevant regulation of project
construction including: (1) Relevant regulations of construc-
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Assign risk bearer

Assign risk bearer
Fig. 1. Structure for judgment of contract risk liability.

tion procurement, (2) Relevant regulations of labor, safety,
health and environment protection, (3) Particular construction
regulations such as Highway Act, Railway Act and Mass
Rapid Transportation Act for traffic engineering and see if
there is special requirement on risk-sharing, which provides
legal basis for obligation of distributing contract risk.
2) Assessment Model on Risk Controlling Ability
(I) Structure of Assessment
1. According to research recommendation made by Chou [8],
Erikson [11], and Ku [14]:
(1) The risk bearer must be the participant in the construction and most capable of predict and prevent the risk.
(2) The risk bearer must be the party that can promptly deal
with the risk via existing system and resources.
(3) The risk bearer must be the party that can deal with the
risk with most economical and effect method.
2. In reference with the above mentioned principles, this article
has compiled recommendation by Bunni [5], Lai [15] and
result from interview with experts to set the structure of
assessment for risk-controlling ability (as shown in Fig. 2),
where the measurement of which party in the contract possess better influencing, controlling and handling ability can
be taken as basis of risk distribution.
(1) The influencing ability discusses about actual participant or direct executor of relevant work. Such ability is
used to measure the party that has greater power of influence on occurrence and handling of the risk.
(2) The controlling ability verifies the person that is more
capable of dealing with the risk and evaluating probability of occurrence for such risk, as well as information
channel on degree of influence.
(3) The handling ability measures the party that is more

Fig. 2. Assessment structure for controlling ability of contract risk.

capable of handling the risk in most economical and
effect way via existing system (government/private),
relevant resources possessed (personnel, machinery and
fund) and professional technique provided.
(II) Consideration and Steps of Assessment
1. Prior to assessment of risk controlling ability, investigation
and evaluation must be carried out on following aspects
first:
(1) Authority: Is it for general administration or professed in
construction affairs? What are the information channel,
man-power and budget possessed? How is the ability of
plan management and past experience on dealing with
relevant coordination?
(2) Relevant entity and related suppliers: What is the quantity of relevant entity, related suppliers and affairs to be
cooperated for the project construction? How is the
cooperating ability for other party and progress of relevant construction?
(3) Contractors: How is the qualification and scale of the
contractor? What are the organizations, man-power, financial power, technology, and relevant resources of
machinery and equipment that shall be possessed? What
is the ability of program management that shall be provided? What is the similar experience of construction in
the past?
2. As for the assessment on risk controlling ability, the following steps can be followed:
(1) Firstly, suitable items of assessment are selected against
each contract risk.
(2) Secondly, measure and see which of the contracting party
has better advantage of controlling the risk according to
each assessing item.
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(3) Lastly, appoint the risk bearer according to result of
assessment on each item.

Policy of risk

3) Evaluation Model for Risk-Sharing Cost

Function

Risk control

Risk finance

Reserve

Transfer

Guarantee/
insurance

Guarantee/
insurance (Cf3)

Technique

Fixed cost (Cf2)

Transfer

Loss from Risk
(Cf1)

Mitigate

Fixed cost (Cc3)

Prevent

Prevention/
reduction cost
(Cc2)

1. For relevant study overseas in the past:
(1) The “Risk Attitude Method of Analysis” established by
Mason [22] applied cash flow analysis for combination
with risk analysis of probability theory and utility
analysis of decision maker, which calculates expected
effect of cost needed on each risk treating methods (e.g.
risk retention or transfer). According to this, most
suitable policy of handling and contractual terms are
selected.
(2) The “Construction Process Risk Model” developed by
Erikson [11] set the target function of cost for the owner
first, and then calculates possible total cost according to
theory of effect, which is then used to select most economical method of risk-sharing. However, this model is
limited to the fact that contractor’s attitude of risk needs
to be more conservative than the owner. In addition, the
greatest defect is to assume that comprehension from
owner and contractor on probability of particular risk
and possible damage is consistent, which is not so in
reality.
(3) The conceptual model of risk allocation built by Levitt
and Ashley [19] is based on comprehension from owner
and contractor towards risks, preference of risk acceptance and different cost needed on risk bearing. The
foundation of theoretical analysis adopted by the model
is based on the utility function of owner and contractor
to discuss relationships of variation between different
method of risk-sharing and contract amount, which acts
as reference for adjusting requirement of risk-sharing
contract.
Summary on result: The degree of reaction on price comparison of risk-sharing is determined by attitude from both
parties of the contract towards the risk, as well as utility of
monetary value, perception on risk and cost required for risk
handling.
2. However, establishment of public construction needs to
“administrate according to law” in everything, thus the authority in fact cannot determine personal subjective attitude
on risk and utility of monetary value while making a
risk-sharing decision. In addition, the authority pursues
different target and benefit from construction comparing to
the supplier, the perception on risk differs naturally. Therefore,
the assessment on risk-sharing cost can only be discussed objectively on items that spend lower cost on risk handling or,
alternatively, based on different method (or program) of
risk-sharing for specific risk and calculate cost of risk for both
parties to share, which takes minimization of total cost as the
target and assess for optimal program of risk-sharing. The initial construction of target function is as follows:

Increase of
managing cost
(Cc1)

(I) Evaluation Model

Cost

Indirect
managing
Cost (Cm)

Risk handling cost
(Crt)

Fig. 3. Illustration on cost structure of risk handling.

Target function
= min{total risk-sharing cost}
= min{risk handling cost for authority + risk handling
cost for contractor + other costs}
= min{G(Crt) + C(Crt) + Co}
(II) Cost of Assessment
1. Risk handling cost(Crt) includes cost from risk control(Cc),
cost from risk finance(Cf) and charge on intermediate
management(Cm); the cost structure is detailed per Fig. 3.
2. Other cost(Co) includes cost from possible transaction(Co1),
cost from dispute handling(Co2) and other hidden cost(Co3).
4) Evaluation Model for Risk-Sharing Performance
(I) Evaluation Model
1. In the past, the Construction Industry Institute [4] has interviewed experts and utilized analysis with influence Figure against four clauses, namely the “Indemnity”, “Consequential Damage”, “Differing Conditions” and “Delay” in
construction contract. Discussion has been made on influence from different rules of risk-sharing towards “Project
Performance”, “Working Relationship” and “Cost Effectiveness” that can be possibly obtained. Suggestion for
selecting each contract clause is proposed, but it is only limited to qualitative analysis.
2. The evaluation model for contract risk-sharing performance
(as per Fig. 4 below) established in this article refers to the
evaluation model for performance developed by Hsieh and
Wang [13] Analytic Hierarchy Process (AHP) is applied and
combined with Fuzzy Synthetic Decision Method (FSDM),
which specifies possible benefit of procurement contract
against different risk sharing and executes quantitative
analysis and evaluation. The steps are as follows:
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Evaluation of contract risk-sharing performance
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Level 3

Fig. 5. Structure of evaluation hierarchy for contract risk-sharing performance.

Select rules for risk-sharing
Fig. 4. Evaluation model of contract risk-sharing performance.

(II) Evaluation Steps
Step 1: Establish structure of evaluation hierarchy for risksharing performance (as per Fig. 5):
1. Benefit of construction tender invitation – A fair and reasonable risk-sharing can attract well-established suppliers
to participate in tendering and enhance fair competition,
which also prevent the vendor from reflecting excessive risk
fund in tender price, so that acquisition of more reasonable
tender price is made. Therefore, the “Benefit of construction tender invitation” will take “enhancement of virtuous
tender competition” and “acquisition of reasonable tender
price” as further guidelines for evaluation.
2. Result of contract cooperation － In addition to passively
disarm hostile attitude between both parties of the contract,
adoption of fair contract and reasonable sharing of risk can
actively promote for peaceful execution of construction
during work periods and reduce occurrence of contractual
dispute. Therefore, the “Result of contract cooperation”
will take “improvement of work relations” and “reduction
of contractual dispute” as further guidelines for evaluation.
3. Performance of work execution – The final goal of construction management is to complete the work as “scheduled, formulated and specified”. Similarly, a fair and
reasonable risk sharing is also expected to provide positive
assistance on work progress, construction quality and cost.
Therefore, the “Performance of work execution” will take
“promotion for work progress”, “enhancement for work
quality” and “reduction of construction cost” as further
guidelines for evaluation.
Step 2: Weight analysis of evaluation index (guideline)
With questionnaire of AHP [17], a group of experts consisting the authority (14 members) and construction suppliers

(9 members) is consulted to first execute pair-wise comparison on three evaluation indexes, namely the “Benefit of tender
invitation”, “Result of contract cooperation” and “Performance of work execution”. After relative weights are obtained,
separate execution is made for pair-wise comparison, weight
calculation and consistency assessment of each evaluation
guideline [12] (results are detailed in Tables 1 and 2).
Step 3: FSDM of risk-sharing performance
With application of FSDM [23], rating of each evaluation
index (guideline) is made against particular risk, where evaluation and ranking of contractual benefit for different
risk-sharing alternatives are made. The steps of judgment are
as follows [9, 19]:
1. Select target to be judged and establish target set of judgment: X = {x1, x2, …, xi}.
2. Determine level of judgment: V = {v1, v2, …, vk}. The fuzzy
linguistic variables adopted by this article in the questionnaire [17] differs according to characteristics of each evaluation guideline U = {u1, u2, …, uj}; however, the level of
judgment is divided into five levels: i.e. very high, high,
medium, low, very low and this is the third type (as per
Fig. 6) of eight converting scale of fuzzy linguistics recommended by Chen and Hwang [6].
3. Establish judgment matrix: R ∈ X × U, rij = R(xi, uj). rij is
the superficial value of judgment target xi on evaluation
factor (index) uj.

v1
 r11

Rxi = (rjk ) n × m = r 21
:

 rn1

v 2 ... vm
r12 ... r1m  u1
r 22 ... r 2 m  u 2
:
:
:  :

rn 2 ... rnm  un

Rxi : FSDM matrix of judgment target (xi)
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Table 1. Assessment result of AHP weight calculation.
Relative weight of each evaluation guideline

Hierarchial consistency assessment

Professionals

Promote virtuout tender competition

Obtain reasonable tender price

Improve work relations

Reduce contract dispute

Promote work progress

Enhance work quality

Reduce construction cost

O01
02
03
04
05
06
07
08
09
10
11
12
13
14
C01
02
03
04
05
06
07
08
09

0.296
0.070
0.125
0.222
0.148
0.549
0.198
0.227
0.167
0.215
0.167
0.517
0.055
0.111
0.200
0.099
0.072
0.450
0.095
0.083
0.070
0.055
0.200

0.037
0.139
0.500
0.222
0.295
0.109
0.099
0.056
0.167
0.215
0.167
0.172
0.055
0.222
0.400
0.197
0.213
0.150
0.047
0.167
0.070
0.055
0.200

0.250
0.093
0.080
0.194
0.085
0.130
0.082
0.070
0.167
0.024
0.250
0.038
0.103
0.111
0.150
0.082
0.072
0.050
0.285
0.333
0.213
0.038
0.133

0.084
0.458
0.159
0.193
0.185
0.026
0.082
0. 07
0.167
0.119
0.083
0.113
0.206
0.222
0.050
0.082
0.072
0.150
0.285
0.167
0.070
0.305
0.067

0.106
0.120
0.027
0.065
0.155
0.037
0.089
0.283
0.133
0.122
0.148
0.032
0.116
0.084
0.080
0.216
0.137
0.108
0.096
0.062
0.189
0.109
0.133

0.153
0.060
0.027
0.075
0.077
0.037
0.292
0.142
0.133
0.061
0.129
0.096
0.349
0.167
0.040
0.108
0.121
0.033
0.096
0.126
0.189
0.219
0.133

0.074
0.060
0.082
0.029
0.155
0.112
0.158
0.142
0.066
0.244
0.056
0.032
0.116
0.083
0.080
0.216
0.313
0.059
0.096
0.062
0.189
0.219
0.134

∑ X /n

0.191

0.172

0.132

0.144

0.115

0.124

0.122

CIH/

RIH=

CRH

<0.1

0.038
0.130
0.005
0.010
0.006
0.015
0.004
0.000
0.015
0.000
0.018
0.003
0.001
0.015
0.000
0.003
0.005
0.001
0.004
0.000
0.009
0.013
0.006

0.773
0.719
0.659
0.678
0.804
0.688
0.893
0.908
0.773
0.829
0.773
0.673
0.918
0.773
0.696
0.893
0.909
0.696
0.746
0.725
0.909
0.898
0.812

0.049
0.018
0.008
0.015
0.011
0.022
0.004
0.000
0.019
0.000
0.023
0.004
0.001
0.019
0.000
0.003
0.006
0.001
0.005
0.000
0.010
0.014
0.007

OK
OK
OK
OK
OK
OK
OK
OK
OK
OK
OK
OK
OK
OK
OK
OK
OK
OK
OK
OK
OK
OK
OK

n

i

i =1

rjk : Degree of membership for judgment target (xi)
judged as level (vk) according to evaluation guideline (uj) (number of experts judged as level vk /total
number of experts interviewed)
4. Conversion of fuzzy performance
According to calculation result from Chen and Hwang [6],
the membership values represented by each fuzzy linguistics
are: ut(very high) = 0.909, ut(high) = 0.717, ut(medium) = 0.500, ut(low) =
0.283, ut(very low) = 0.091. The following section will base on
these membership values and convert each fuzzy judgment set
into precise performance value.
(1) Apply the following formulae for fuzzy performance
conversion of each judgment matrix.

m

Pij =

∑r

jk

× ut (vk ), ( j = 1, 2, .... n; k = 1, 2, .... m)

k =1

Pij:

Fuzzy performance value for judgment target (xi)
above evaluation guideline (uj).
rjk: Degree of membership for judgment target (xi)
judged as level (vk) according to evaluation
guideline (uj) (number of experts judged as level
vk /total number of experts interviewed)
ut(vk): Fuzzy linguistic membership value at level vk.
(2) Regarding the performance evaluation on possibility of
“obtaining reasonable tender price”, separate calculation
is made for fuzzy performance value from construction
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Table 2. Relative weight of evaluation index and guideline
for contract risk-sharing performance.
Evaluation index

Weight

Benefit of
tender
invitation

0.363

Result of
contract
cooperation

0.276

Performance of
construction
execution

0.361

very low

low

Evaluation guideline
Promote virtuous
tender competition
Reduce contract
dispute
Improve work
relations
Reduce contract
dispute
Promote work
progress
Enhance work
quality
Reduce construction
cost

medium

high

Weight
0.191
0.172
0.132
0.144
0.115
0.124
0.122

very high

1.0
0.9
0.8
0.7
0.6
0.5
0.4
0.3
0.2
0.1
0.0
0.1

0.2 0.3

0.4 0.5

0.6

0.7

0.8

0.9 1.0

Fig. 6. Converting scale of fuzzy linguistics.

supplier’s tender price reaction and budgeted bottom
price that might be allocated by the owner. After that,
the ratio of fuzzy performance is allocated into five levels, and the membership value µt(rt/b)) of level belonged is taken as fuzzy performance value for possibility of “obtaining reasonable tender price”.
t

b

=

P12
P22
M
Pm 2

L P1n 
L P2 n 
M
M 

L Pmn  i× j






•





w1 

w2 

M 

w j  j×1

4. Setting of Risk-Sharing Program
Suitable decision model of sharing is selected against characteristics of each contract risk and sharing program of each
contract risk is set according to result of decision analysis,
which includes: scope of risk that shall be shared by both
parties, basis of sharing and method of sharing.
The authority can consider the characteristics of project
construction, goal of planning, competitiveness and demand-supply environment in the market, as well as financial
budget and managing ability of the authority itself for selection of adequate risk reduction and/or measure of financial
benefit. This can reduce probability of risk occurrence, loss
and financial (or risk) burden on the contractor, which further
improves supplier’s ability for contract performance and
promote for smooth progress of construction.
5. Structure of Risk-Sharing Decision System
Following the steps of decision analysis above, this article
has compiled factors of decision consideration at each phase
for constructing the structure of decision system for public
construction contract risk-sharing (as per Fig. 7), which provides foundation of selecting risk-sharing decision for the
authority.

0.0

r

 E ( X 1 )  P11
 E ( X )  P
2 
21

=
 M   M
 

 E ( X i )  Pm1
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reaction of tender price from constructi on vendors (fuzzy performanc e value)
owner' s budgeted bottom price (fuzzy performanc e value)

when r

t

b

< 0.8,

when 0.8 ≤ r
when 0.9 ≤ r

t

when 1.1 < r
when 1.2 < r

t

t

t

the assessment is “excellent”

b

< 0.9, the assessment is “good”

b

≤ 1.1, the assessment is “okay”

≤ 1.2, the assessment is “bad”
the assessment is “worst”
b,

b

5. The calculation of synthetic judgment E(xi) for each judgment target xi select the best option according to maximum
degree of membership.

III. APPLICATION AND PRACTICAL
EXAMPLES OF DECISION ANALYSIS
ON RISK-SHARING
1. Investigation and Analysis on Contract Risk of Public
Construction
According to results from investigations and statistics of
this article (detailed per Table. 3), the most principal contract
risk of public construction in Taiwan at present include the
following:
1. “Fulfillment”: (1) delay in removal of public piping or
above-ground objects; (2) delay in acquisition of construction land; (3) delay in work; and (4) delay in cooperation
with relevant supplier (construction).
2. On the aspect of “change in external environment”: (1)
public resistance and interference; (2) rising price and
wages; (3) natural disasters such as typhoon, earthquake and
flood; as well as (4) abnormal condition on site, which induce maximum impact to the construction.
Since the “rising price and wages” induce most direct influence on work cost, it also generates the most severe possible impact; thus the contractor lists this item as the primary
contract risk. Furthermore, although the amplitude of wage
variation is smaller over recent years, the overall price of
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Authority
Project
construction

Risk identification
Risk analysis
Risk classification

Identification & confirmation of
contract risk

• Relevant legal specification
• Ability of participants
• Risk handling cost

Decision analysis of
risk sharing

Judgment of risk liability
Assessment of risk controlling ability
Assessment of risk sharing cost
Evaluation of risk-sharing performance

Select risk-sharing program

Type/scope of sharing
Basis/method of sharing

Risk reduction
Financial benefit

Contractor
Construction contract agreement

Risk perception

Allocate

Reaction

Adjustment of risk-sharing
requirement

Pricing

Risk control
Risk finance

Evaluation of risk
handling policy

Budget

Select risk handling
program
Reserve

Distribute

Assessment of risk controlling ability
Assessment of risk sharing cost
Evaluation of risk-sharing performance

Transfer
Sub/supply contract

Fig. 7. Structure of public construction contract risk-sharing decision system.

construction project and concrete has raised for approximately
40%; the price of aggregate and reinforcement even rise to
amplitude of 80% or more than 110% (as per Fig. 8). This has
caused tremendous cost burden to suppliers and several appeals have been made to the construction authority for request
of setting relevant measures on compensation, which creates
extensive difficulty for the authorities. In view of this, this
article takes the risk from “rising price and wages” as the
practical example of contract risk-sharing decision analysis.
2. Decision Analysis of Risk-Sharing for Rising Price and
Wages
Regarding the risk-sharing for “rising price and wages” in
accordance with result from investigation and statistics of this
article (detailed per Table 4), approximately 44% of experts
think that risk model of “assessment on controlling ability”
can be adopted and taken as foundation of sharing decision; on
the other hand, 39% of experts thank that result of “evaluation
on sharing performance” can be referred for synthetic judgment. Separate assessments are as follows: (I) Assessment of
risk controlling ability
The results of assessment made in this article after consulting with professional opinions (detailed per Table 5):

1. Influencing ability: The rise and fall of price and wages are
basically influenced by overall economy, demand-supply
environment in the market, relevant regulation and policy;
thus the time of rise/fall, magnitude, the authority and supplier has no direct influencing ability.
2. Controlling ability: Since the units interviewed are authorities and contractors of major constructions, they have substantial experience in handling rising/falling price and wages;

in addition, each of them has certain channel for information and price enquiry, so they can control the tendency of
price rise/fall and respond as soon as possible.
3. Handling ability: The authority bears lower capital cost and
it is capable of adopting adequate risk-sharing measure (e.g.
offer advance payment to suppliers for material preparation),
which reduces risk of price fluctuation; the suppliers on
other hand are more capable of distributing the risk via organized supply chain (e.g. reduce the wages when price
rises and delay payment to sub-contractors) and reduce influence of price fluctuation via risk-prevention measures
such as contract of long-term supply and purchase of futures.
Summing up the results from assessment above, the authority and supplier has certain risk controlling ability each,
thus this risk is preferably to be shared by both parties.
1) Evaluation on Risk-Sharing Performance
As for the evaluation on risk-sharing performance, this article refers to adjustment regulated [21] by each country (detailed per Table 6) and takes 3 methods that are more representative. According to degree of risk undertaken by both
parties of the contract, type A, B and C clause of “price adjustment” are set and taken as judgment target; moreover, the
evaluation model established in this article for contract risk
sharing performance is applied for executing assessment and
FSDM of each evaluation guideline.
Clause A: The construction amount is adjusted in accordance with actual variation of rise/fall on overall
price (the owner undertakes most or all risks).
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Table 3. Investigation and statistics of public construction contract risks.
Construction owner
Degree of
influence

Synthetic
evaluation

Possibility of
occurrence

Degree of
influence

Synthetic
evaluation

Possibility of
occurrence

Degree of
influence

Synthetic
evaluation

Contract risk
Defects in contract fulfillment
Delay in acquisition of construction land
Delay in removal of public piping or
above-ground objects
Delay in approval of relevant permits and
certificates
Delay in supply of design drawing or equipments
Delay in work instruction and administration of
contract
Delay in cooperation with relevant supplier
(construction)
Delay in work
Mistake in work
Accident under work safety
Traffic and environment contamination
Variation of external environment
Natural disasters such as land slide, earthquake,
flood and typhoon
War, riot or nuclear incidence
Abnormal condition on site
Amendment of relevant regulation and policy
Public resistance and interference
Rising price and wages
Variation of tax rate
Variation of exchange and tax rate

Overall members

Possibility of
occurrence

Characteristics

Contractor

2.04

4.65

3

2.38

4.77

1

2.17

4.69

2

2.43

4.39

1

2.46

4.46

2

2.44

4.42

1

1.65

3.83

5

1.54

3.85

8

1.61

3.83

6

1.27

3.50

10

1.31

3.77

10

1.29

3.60

10

1.52

3.39

9

1.85

3.77

6

1.64

3.53

8

2.09

3.73

4

2.00

3.92

4

2.06

3.80

4

2.36
1.50
1.45
1.48

4.18
4.18
3.91
3.62

2
6
7
8

2.46
1.77
1.77
1.92

4.15
4.31
3.69
3.08

3
5
7
8

2.40
1.60
1.57
1.65

4.17
4.21
3.83
3.41

3
5
7
9

1.65

3.91

3

2.00

3.54

3

1.78

3.78

3

1.00
1.59
1.52
2.00
1.86
1.20
1.45

4.40
4.00
3.91
4.26
4.13
2.95
2.85

6
4
5
1
2
8
7

1.08
1.38
1.67
1.92
2.21
1.31
1.54

4.33
4.08
3.75
4.23
4.26
2.85
2.92

6
5
4
2
1
8
7

1.03
1.51
1.57
1.97
1.98
1.24
1.48

4.38
4.03
3.86
4.25
4.19
2.91
2.88

6
4
5
1
2
8
7

*Possibility of occurrence: large = 3, medium = 2, small = 1
Degree of influence: very important = 5, important = 4, normal = 3, minor = 2, irrelevant = 1
Synthetic evaluation: ranked according to magnitude of product from “Possibility of occurrence” and “Degree of influence”.

Price Indax Base Period: Year 2001 = 100
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Fig. 8. Historical curve of variation on project price and wages.
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Table 4. Investigation and statistics of applicable sharing decision model for contract risks.
Decision model for risk-sharing
(multiple selection allowed)
Evaluation of

sharing
performance

Assessment of
sharing cost

Assessment of

controlling
ability

liability

Contract risk
Defects in contract fulfillment
Delay in acquisition of construction land
Delay in removal of public piping or above-ground objects
Delay in approval of relevant permits and certificates
Delay in supply of design drawing or equipments
Delay in work instruction and administration of contract
Delay in cooperation with relevant supplier (construction)
Delay in work
Mistake in work
Accident under work safety
Traffic and environment contamination
Variation of external environment
Natural disasters such as land slide, earthquake, flood and typhoon
War, riot or nuclear incidence
Abnormal condition on site
Amendment of relevant regulation and policy
Public resistance and interference
Rising price and wages
Variation of tax rate
Variation of exchange and tax rate
*The values listed are in percentages (%)

Judgment of

Characteristics

59.3
32.2
27.1
39.0
61.0
52.5
69.5
69.5
66.1
57.6

27.1
44.1
44.1
47.4
32.2
27.1
22.0
22.0
22.0
22.0

5.1
15.3
15.3
5.1
5.1
13.5
8.5
11.9
18.6
22.0

10.2
10.2
13.5
8.5
8.5
18.6
8.5
8.5
8.5
13.5

3.4
3.4
25.4
32.2
18.6
6.8
11.9
11.9

39.0
37.3
50.8
37.3
44.1
44.1
42.4
42.4

39.0
33.9
25.4
18.6
25.4
25.4
15.3
22.0

37.3
33.9
20.3
25.4
27.1
39.0
37.3
39.0

Table 5. Result from assessment on risk controlling ability on rising price and wages.

Organization

Resources
possessed

Professional
technique

Authority

Supplier

Authority

Supplier

Authority

Supplier

Authority

Authority

Supplier

○

○

○

○

◎

◎

○

○

Controlling ability

Supplier

1. On the aspect of “promoting virtuous tender competition”:
all experts think that Clause A or B impose positive assistance for promoting virtuous competition of construction

Share

Clause B: The adjustment is only made when portion of
overall price rise/fall that has exceeded 5% (both
parties share the risk).
Clause C: No adjustment is made despite of rise/fall on
price and wages (the contractor undertakes most
or all risks).

Risk distribution

Authority

◎: with relative advantage ○: equivalent

Handling ability

Supplier

*Risk controlling ability:

Information
channel

Supplier

Result from
assessment

Relevant
experience

Authority

Item assessed

Influencing
ability
Degree of
participation

√

tenders (differs slightly in extent), where Clause C may
possibly generate negative influence.
2. According to fuzzy performance ration from supplier’s
“reaction on tender price” and owner’s possible “budgeted
bottom price,” the ranking for reasonable tender price
that can possibly be obtained by 3 clauses above is as
follows:
Clause A with rt / b = 0.091/0.091
= 1.000 is ranked as “okay”
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Table 6. Summary of adjustment for variation of price and wages in each country.
Country
FIDIC
UK
Germany
Austria
USA
Japan

Singapore

Taiwan

Adjustment
(1) For construction that has duration less than 1 year and fixed price, the construction payment is not to be adjusted;
(2) Adjustment is calculated from difference between basic price and actual price for local manpower and particular
material; or
(3) Certain formula is applied according to particular price index for calculating the adjustment for portion of actual rise.
In accordance with FIDIC’s adjustment.
Adjust according to different in actual price.
(1) Simplification: The construction price is divided into total wages and total material, which is adjusted separately
according to published index.
(2) Precision: The adjustment is made according to weighted average price of main material and wages.
Coordination is made between the owner and contractor per cases.
(1) The construction contract is not to be adjusted within 1 year since the date of signature.
(2) After 1 year, adjustment is made for portion of price index (or particular information) that rises over 1.5%.
(3) When there is obvious change on price of main material or inflation, adjustment is made from coordination between two
parties.
(1) The contract prices exceeds NT$ 1 million.
(2) Adjust according to difference in actual price: the government undertakes 70% and the contractor undertakes 30%.
Construction payment is not adjusted according to price fluctuation; or
(1) Items that are construction and repair works and with duration of more than 1 year.
(2) For particular price index published by Directorate-General of Budget, Accounting and Statistics, Executive Yuan with
portion of rising/falling amplitude that exceeds 5%, the construction payment (or the payment of particular items
specified by the authority during tender invitation) is adjusted after completion of inspection.

Clause B with rt / b = 0.451/0.457
= 0.987 is ranked as “okay”
Clause C with rt / b = 0.822/0.681
= 1.207 is ranked as “worst”

(2) Yet for influence from Clause C towards work execution
performance, most of both parties hold the negative
viewpoint except for minor difference on the extent.
E=P•W
0.191

3. As for influence of “relationships in contract work” on both
Party A and B, both the owner and supplier think that Clause
A or B imposes low and positive influence on work harmony, while Clause C may possibly imposes low and negative influence.
4. There are approximately 90% of experts think that chances
of possible contract dispute from adoption of Clause A or B
are very low. For adoption of Clause C on the other hand,
there are approximately 50% in each group of owner and
suppliers think that the chances of contract dispute are very
high, if the price fluctuation exceeds bearable scope of the
contractor.
5. As for the influence of “work execution performance”:
(1) The viewpoints between owner and supplier on influence from Clause A and B against execution performance of work duration and cost are rather different.
The reason mainly arises from the fact that some owners
worry about supplier’s possible and intentional extension of work duration for extra compensation from price
adjustment; hence the negative viewpoint. Most suppliers think that they can be better off the worries and
concentrate on actual work if there is adequate measure
of price adjustment; hence the positive attitude.

Clause A 0.799
= Clause B 0.717
Clause C
0.277

0.500
0.500
0.091

0.780
0.679
0.295

0.832
0.817
0.495

0.571
0.580
0.433

0.648
0.604
0.363

0.172
0.601 0.132
0.557 0.144
0.286 0.115
0.124
0.122

0.680
0.418
= 0.640 ÷ 1.628 = 0.393
0.308
0.189

6. FSDM: After summarizing the result of synthetic assessment made by experts towards 3 different clauses of risksharing above (detailed per Table 7), as well as conversion
of fuzzy performance, weighted calculation and unified
process (calculation results shown as follows), the FSDM
index for Clause A, B and C is [0.418, 0.393, 0.189] respectively. This reveals that the regulation of “price adjustment” shall adopt Clause A (adjust according to actual
rise/fall) preferably, which is also the clause adopted by
more advanced countries in Europe and America at present.
However, there is not much difference in fuzzy synthetic
performance value obtained from Clause B (only adjust the
portion with rise/fall exceeding 5%).
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Table 7. Synthetic assessment from experts on different regulation of risk-sharing on “price adjustment”.
Clause A
Judgment level
Evaluation Guideline
Enhance virtuous competition
Obtain reasonable tender price
Improve work relationships
Reduce contract dispute
Promote work progress
Enhance work quality
Reduce construction cost

Very high

High

Medium

Low

Very low

0.566

0.304

0.000

0.000

0.566
0.740
0.217
0.174
0.217

0.261
0.174
0.174
0.392
0.436

0.130
rt/b = 0.091/0.091 = 1.000
0.130
0.043
0.392
0.391
0.043

0.043
0.043
0.174
0.043
0.217

0.000
0.000
0.043
0.000
0.087

Very high

High

Medium

Low

Very low

0.100

0.800

0.000

0.000

0.045
0.609
0.000
0.048
0.000

0.728
0.348
0.455
0.429
0.650

0.100
rt/b = 0.451/0.457 = 0.987
0.227
0.000
0.454
0.476
0.000

0.000
0.043
0.091
0.047
0.300

0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.050

Very high

High

Medium

Low

Very low

0.000

0.048

0.619

0.238

0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.045

0.000
0.479
0.182
0.045
0.045

0.095
rt/b = 0.822/0.681 = 1.207
0.277
0.130
0.409
0.364
0.045

0.591
0.261
0.318
0.500
0.592

0.182
0.130
0.091
0.091
0.273

Fuzzy
performance
value
0.799
0.500
0.500
0.832
0.571
0.648
0.601

Clause B
Judgment level
Evaluation Guideline
Enhance virtuous competition
Obtain reasonable tender price
Improve work relationships
Reduce contract dispute
Promote work progress
Enhance work quality
Reduce construction cost

Fuzzy
performance
value
0.717
0.500
0.679
0.817
0.580
0.604
0.557

Clause C
Judgment level
Evaluation Guideline
Enhance virtuous competition
Obtain reasonable tender price
Improve work relationships
Reduce contract dispute
Promote work progress
Enhance work quality
Reduce construction cost

2) Preliminary Discussion of Risk-Sharing Program
Combining the assessment on risk controlling ability and
evaluation result of sharing performance above, the relevant
risk on “rising price and wages” is announced to be shared by
both parties for encouraging the supplier to distribute risks via
organizational supply chain. As for the sharing program, this
article has drafted according to present regulation, requirement of foreign/domestic construction contract (detailed per
Table 6) and professional opinions:
1. Methods of sharing:
(1) For construction that has duration less than (1 year), the
construction payment is not to be adjusted along with
price fluctuation.
(2) For construction that has duration more than (1 year),
the construction payment can be adjusted according to
particular price index, particularly on the portion with

Fuzzy
performance
value
0.277
0.091
0.295
0.495
0.433
0.363
0.286

overall (or particular item) price rising/falling amplitude
exceeding (5%).
2. Requirement of sharing:
When the construction payment is adjusted according to
particular price index, the following items shall be specified
clearly in the contract:
(1) The cost items that have to be adjusted (overall or particular items).
(2) Particular price index and base period as basis for the
adjustment.
(3) Situation that needs to be adjusted or not adjusted.
(4) Calculation formula for the adjustment.
(5) Adjustment data and proof that have to be provided by
supplier.
(6) Management fee, insurance premium, profit and other
taxes/miscellaneous fees (excluding business tax) are
not to be adjusted.
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(7) Applicable measures of adjustment for design variation
or overdue contract execution.
3. Measure of sharing:
The authority can consider on characteristics and budget of
project construction, as well as its own resources possessed
and managing ability to select the following measures of risksharing:
(1) Provide advance payment to relieve contractor’s burden
of fund raising at beginning of construction and reduce
influence from price fluctuation. However, practical
measures of supplier receiving and returning the advanced payment shall be specified clearly in the contract,
where the supplier is requested to provide advanced
payment bond first.
(2) The price of qualified materials is costed first to relieve
supplier’s financial pressure. However, supplier’s substantial obligation of safe keeping shall be specified in
the contract.
(3) Major equipments or materials are provided by the authority to relieve supplier’s risk of material supply.
However, relevant matters of cooperation and coordination shall be specified clearly in the contract, as well
as enhancing the management on supplier’s contract
execution.

IV. CONCLUSIONS AND SUGGESTIONS
1. By referring to relevant literature and following logic of
risk-sharing decision, the “Public Construction Contract
Risk-Sharing Decision System” developed and established
in this article can be provided to the authority as foundation
of selecting the risk-sharing decision.
2. Unless specified clearly in relevant regulations such as the
Civil Code or the Government Procurement Act, the decision analysis related to contract risk sharing in principle can
take assessment result on supplier’s risk controlling ability
as basis of risk-sharing decision.
3. The evaluation model of contract risk-sharing performance
established in this article by combining AHP and FSDM can
be basis for authority upon selecting quantitative analysis
for optimal risk-sharing decision.
4. According to result of decision analysis made in this article
for risk of “rising price and wages”, it is suggested that the
authority shall select the sharing program of “adjust the
portion with rising/falling amplitude exceeding (5%) according to particular price index” for construction with
duration exceeding 1 year.
5. The authority is suggested to set fair and reasonable contract
that regulates rights and obligations for both parties with
principle of equal and mutual benefit, which is expected to
be followed in the industry. However, members from each
party shall establish mutual understanding on reasonable
sharing of contract risks and bring out the expected function
of contract with principle of maximum sincerity.
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